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For over the last three decades, the United States Supreme Court 
has consistently held that officials at public colleges and universities 
must operate within the confines of the First Amendment, and are thus 
generally precluded from impinging upon the fundamental rights of 
college and university students to freedom of speech and freedom of 
the press.1 Nonetheless, in June, 2005, the Court of Appeals for the 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate and Certificate in Litigation and Alternative Dispute 
Resolution candidate, May 2007, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.S. cum laude, June 2004, Northwestern University, Medill School of 
Journalism. Julia R. Lissner is deeply indebted to the following individuals for their 
comprehensive input on this Comment: Professor Hal R. Morris, John G. New, 
Barbara C. Long, and Julie Ann Sullivan. 
1 See Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (university officials 
constitutionally prohibited from denying funding to religious student magazine 
based on content); Papish v. Bd. of Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (state university’s 
expulsion of student for disseminating student newspaper that officials deemed 
indecent was unconstitutional); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (universities 
cannot refuse to recognize controversial campus groups or speakers); see also, e.g., 
Stanley v. Magrath, 719 F.2d 279 (8th Cir. 1983) (university acted unconstitutionally 
by attempting to restructure funding to student newspaper because of controversial 
1
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Seventh Circuit rendered a decision that runs contrary to the spirit of 
the Supreme Court’s precedent and the Court’s commitment to 
protecting free speech at institutions of higher learning.2 In Hosty v. 
Carter,3 a 7-4 decision en banc, the Seventh Circuit extended the 
Supreme Court’s high school-specific standard set forth in Hazelwood 
School District v. Kuhlmeier4 to review a student newspaper 
censorship claim at Governors State University (“GSU”), a public 
university in Illinois.5 The decision en banc overturned the earlier 
judgment of a unanimous three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit that 
held that, given the more than 30 years of law providing strong First 
Amendment protection to the college student press, the Hazelwood 
standard was limited to primary and secondary education.6 In addition, 
the majority in the decision en banc discounted the significance of 
Hazelwood’s footnote seven, in which the Supreme Court stated that it 
“need not now decide whether the same degree of deference [to the 
decisions of high school administrators] is appropriate with respect to 
school-sponsored expressive activities at the college and university 
level.”7 
                                                                                                                   
issue); Schiff v. Williams, 519 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1975) (university could not censor 
student newspaper and dismiss student editors for alleged poor grammar and 
spelling); Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1973) (university may not 
withdraw support for student newspaper because university disagrees with views 
expressed in publication); Bazaar v. Fortune, 476 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1973) 
(university may not prevent publication and distribution of student yearbook on 
grounds that publication contained language that is “inappropriate and in bad taste”); 
Troy State Univ. v. Dickey, 402 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1968) (university acted 
unconstitutionally by suspending editor of student newspaper editor for content-
related reasons). 
2 See Hosty v. Carter (Hosty II), 412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005) en banc. 
3 Id. 
4 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (permits high 
school administrators to censor school-sponsored speech if their actions are 
supported by “legitimate pedagogical concerns”).  
5 Hosty II, 412 F.3d at 731. 
6 Id.; Hosty v. Carter (Hosty I), 325 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2003) reh’g en banc 
granted, opinion vacated,. 
7 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273 n.7. 
2
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This Comment will contend that the Seventh Circuit erred in 
extending the Hazelwood analysis to college and university campuses 
absent more direction from the Supreme Court. Section I will recount 
the Hazelwood decision and detail the Hosty litigation. Section II will 
compare the Seventh Circuit’s analyses to how other circuit courts 
have interpreted and applied the Hazelwood holding. Section III will 
examine the differences in age and maturity level between high school 
and college students, as well as the distinct missions of their respective 
educational institutions. Section IV will further discuss the difficulties 
in reconciling the Hosty decision en banc with Supreme Court 
precedent relating to subsidized funding and prior restraints.  
 
I. HAZELWOOD AND ITS APPLICATION BY THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
 
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier is a unique, fact-specific 
holding that is distinguishable from the college newspaper censorship 
claim at issue in Hosty v. Carter. In the 1988 Hazelwood decision, the 
Supreme Court held that high school administrators have broad 
powers to censor school-sponsored newspapers if their actions are 
supported by “legitimate pedagogical concerns.”8 However, the 
Supreme Court explicitly left open the question of whether this First 
Amendment standard is appropriate with respect to censoring college 
student speech9— as was the issue before the Seventh Circuit in 
Hosty.10  
  
A. Pre-Hazelwood Decisions 
 
The Supreme Court decisions leading up to Hazelwood, namely 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District11 and 
                                                 
8 Id. at 261. 
9 Id. at 273 n.7. 
10 See generally. Hosty v. Carter (Hosty II), 412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005) en 
banc, 
11 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
3
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Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,12 evince an important 
distinction between school-sponsored speech, and speech that merely 
occurs on campus. This distinction is critical to understanding the 
Supreme Court’s Hazelwood decision, and is now at issue in 
evaluating the Seventh Circuit’s Hosty decision en banc.  
Before the Supreme Court decided Hazelwood in 1988, the Court 
applied the “material and substantial interference” standard to evaluate 
educational decisions challenged on First Amendment grounds.13 As 
the Court explained in the 1969 case of Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School District, a school can permissibly 
censor its students where student conduct “materially and substantially 
interfere[s] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the 
operation of the school.”14 In Tinker, the court held that the high 
school officials acted unconstitutionally in suspending students who 
refused to remove armbands symbolizing their disapproval of the 
Vietnam War.15 The Court stated that the record failed to evidence any 
facts which might have reasonably led school officials “to forecast 
substantial disruption of or material interference with school 
activities” when the students donned the armbands, and that “no 
disturbances or disorders on the school premises in fact occurred.”16  
Yet, the Supreme Court narrowed the Tinker standard in the 1986 
case of Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser.17 In Bethel, the Court 
held that the First Amendment does not prevent schools from 
determining when lewd and vulgar speech undermines the school's 
basic educational mission, and that it is “perfectly appropriate for the 
school to disassociate itself” from this sort of speech.18 In particular, 
the Court found that the Bethel high school acted properly by 
imposing a two day suspension on a student who gave a lewd speech 
                                                 
12 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
13 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 510. 
14 Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). 
15 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514. 
16 Id. 
17 Bethel, 478 U.S. at 675. 
18 Id. at 685. 
4
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at a school assembly.19 The Court explained that a high school 
assembly or classroom is no place for a sexually explicit monologue 
directed towards an unsuspecting audience of teenage students.20 
The significance of Tinker and Bethel in understanding the 
Supreme Court’s Hazelwood decision, and in now evaluating the 
Seventh Circuit’s Hosty decision en banc, is that the Supreme Court in 
Bethel drew a distinction between the speech in Tinker and Bethel.21 
Notably, the acceptable speech at issue in Tinker was a political 
message that did not intrude upon the mission of the schools or the 
rights of other students, whereas the censorable speech at issue in 
Bethel was the sexual content of a school assembly speech that 
undermined the school's basic educational mission.22 Thus, the Court 
marked the emergence of a distinction between school-sponsored 
curricular speech, and speech that merely occurs on campus.23  
 
B. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier 
 
This curricular/non-curricular distinction later resonated through 
the Court’s 1988 Hazelwood decision.24 Hazelwood involved a high 
school student newspaper, written in the course of and as a curricular 
component of a high school journalism class.25 The high school’s 
curriculum guide described the class, titled Journalism II, as a 
“laboratory situation in which the students publish the school 
newspaper applying skills they have learned in Journalism I.”26 The 
teacher oversaw the style and content of the high school newspaper, 
                                                 
19 Id. at 686. 
20 Id. at 685-86. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 See id. 
24 See generally Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
25 Id. at 268. 
26 Id. 
5
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and was required to submit proof pages to the high school’s principal 
before publication.27  
 Hazelwood arose after the principal objected to two articles 
awaiting publication in the high school newspaper: one story reporting 
on three high school students’ experiences with pregnancy, and a 
second story describing the impact of divorce on students at the 
school.28 The principal objected to the pregnancy article due to 
concern that pregnant students might be identifiable from the text 
(though unidentified by name), and that “the article’s references to 
sexual activity and birth control were inappropriate for some of the 
younger students at the school.”29 The principal objected to the 
divorce article because an identified student disparaged her father in 
the article, and the article’s author did not provide the father an 
opportunity to respond to his daughter’s remarks.30 Believing that 
there was no time to alter the stories before the paper went to press, 
the principal withheld the two pages of the issue that contained these 
two stories in dispute.31  
In response to the principal’s decision, a journalism student sued 
the school district on the grounds that the principal violated her First 
Amendment rights by withholding the two pages from publication.32 
Despite this claim, the Supreme Court ruled that the principal acted 
reasonably in finding that the two articles were unsuitable for the high 
school newspaper because the students were not operating in a public 
                                                 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 263. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 263-64. The Court stated: 
The two pages deleted from the newspaper also contained articles 
on teenage marriage, runaways, and juvenile delinquents, as well 
as a general article on teenage pregnancy. [The principal] testified 
that he had no objection to these articles and that they were deleted 
only because they appeared on the same pages as the two 
objectionable articles..  
   Id. at 264 n.1. 
32 Id. at 264. 
6
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forum and thus the school could reasonably curtail the students’ First 
Amendment rights.33 The Court explained that the high school’s 
facilities may be deemed to be public fora only if school authorities 
have by policy or by practice opened those facilities for indiscriminate 
use by the general public, or by some segment of the public, such as 
student organizations.34 However, if the facilities have instead been 
reserved for other intended purposes, “communicative or otherwise,” 
such as a curricular, instructional environment, “then no public forum 
has been created, and school officials may impose reasonable 
restrictions on the speech of students, teachers, and other members of 
the school community.”35 The Court explained that a school “does not 
create a public forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse,” 
as in a journalism class for example, but rather “only by intentionally 
opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse.”36  
The Supreme Court, accordingly, held that the high school 
principal’s actions did not offend the journalism students’ First 
Amendment rights, because: (1) the newspaper was produced by a 
journalism class and had not been opened by the school as a public 
forum for student expression; (2) as a nonpublic forum, school 
officials would be allowed to censor such student speech if their 
actions were “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns;” 
and (3) the principal’s objections to the articles were reasonably 
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.37 What is more, the Court 
limited its holding in the case to censorship of student media in lower 
education, and dropped a footnote explicitly explaining that the Court 
did not intend for its “legitimate pedagogical concerns” test to extend 
to higher education: 
 
                                                 
33 Id. at 276. 
34 Id. at 267 (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n. v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n., 460 
U.S. 37, 47 (1983)). 
35  Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267. 
36 Id. (citing Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985)). 
37 Id. at 270-72, 274; see Brief for Student Press Law Center, et. al. as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Petitioners Margaret L. Hosty, Jeni S. Porche, and Steven P. 
Barba, 126 S.Ct. 1330 (2006) (No. 05-377).  
7
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FN7. A number of lower federal courts have similarly 
recognized that educators' decisions with regard to the 
content of school-sponsored newspapers, dramatic 
productions, and other expressive activities are entitled 
to substantial deference. We need not now decide 
whether the same degree of deference is appropriate 
with respect to school-sponsored expressive activities 
at the college and university level.38 
 
With this footnote, the Court explicitly left open the question of 
whether the Hazelwood First Amendment standard is appropriate with 
respect to censoring college student speech,39 and such now becomes 
the crux of the controversy with respect to the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision en banc in the case of Hosty v. Carter.40 
 
B. Hosty v. Carter 
 
1. From “Innovators” to Litigators 
 
In January, 2001, three student journalists, proceeding pro se, 
sued officials at Governors State University, alleging prior restraint 
violations of their First Amendment rights.41 Editor Margaret Hosty, 
Managing Editor Jeni Porche, and Staff Reporter Steven Barba filed 
suit after the Dean of Student Affairs and Services Patricia Carter 
ordered their newspaper’s printer to hold future issues of the 
publication until a school official could give approval to the paper’s 
contents.42 The university student newspaper, the Innovator, had 
occasionally published news stories and editorials critical of the 
                                                 
38 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273 n.7 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
39 Id. 
40 Hosty v. Carter (Hosty II), 412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005) en banc, 
41 Id.; Hosty v. Carter Information Page, Student Law Press Center, 
http://www.splc.org/legalresearch.asp?id=49 (last visited April 14, 2006). 
42 Hosty II, 412 F.3d at 733. 
8
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administration.43 Dean Carter issued the directive for prepublication 
review despite the public university’s policy that student newspaper 
staff “will determine content and format . . . without censorship or 
advance approval.”44  
On August 30, 2001, the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois allowed the students’ case to go forward, denying 
the university’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to 
state a claim.45 Then, on November 15, 2001, on motion for summary 
judgment, the federal district court held that all university officials 
named in the suit— except Dean Carter— were entitled to qualified 
immunity.46 The court cited a question of fact as to the dean’s actions 
in halting future publication of the Innovator.47  
Shortly thereafter, Dean Carter appealed the decision of the 
district court.48 In support of her interlocutory appeal, Illinois Attorney 
General Jim Ryan asked the Seventh Circuit to apply and extend the 
Supreme Court’s Hazelwood decision— which set forth the standard 
under which high school administrators could permissibly censor 
school-sponsored speech— to the university context.49 
 
2. First Draft: Seventh Circuit’s Three-Judge Panel 
 
On April 10, 2003, a three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit 
issued a decision in favor of the college free press, and unanimously 
upheld the district court’s refusal to grant summary judgment in favor 
                                                 
43 Id. at 732, 742. The articles included report on university’s decision not to 
renew teaching contract of newspaper’s faculty advisor, and commentaries critical of 
other university officials, including the dean of the College of Arts and Sciences. Id.  
44 Id. at 744. 
45 Hosty v. Governors State Univer., 174 F. Supp.2d 782 (N.D. Ill. 2001). 
46 Hosty v. Governors State Univer., No. 01 C 500, 2001 WL 1465621, at *1 
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 15, 2001) (rev’d by Hosty II, 412 F.3d 731). 
47 Id. at *7. 
48 See generally Hosty v. Carter (Hosty I), 325 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2003), 
49 See Brief for Defendant-Appellant Patricia Carter, 325 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 
2003) (No. 01-4155). 
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of Dean Carter.50 The panel, composed of Judges Coffey, Rovner, and 
Evans ruled that college and university students possess greater press 
freedoms than high school students, and refused to grant qualified 
immunity to Dean Carter.51 Writing for the unanimous panel, Judge 
Evans explained that “qualified immunity protects government 
officials performing discretionary functions when their conduct does 
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 
which a reasonable person would have known.”52 The panel rejected 
Dean Carter's argument that she could not reasonably have known that 
it was illegal to order the Innovator’s printer to halt publication of the 
newspaper or to require prior approval of the newspaper's content in 
light of the existing, well-established law.53 In particular, the 
unanimous panel emphasized the more than three decades of precedent 
supporting First Amendment protections across college and university 
campuses, and thus declined to extend the Supreme Court’s 
Hazelwood standard for censoring high school speech to apply to the 
college student media censorship claim at issue in the case.54  
In response to the decision, Illinois Attorney General Lisa 
Madigan filed a petition on behalf of Dean Carter for a rehearing en 
banc.55 Rehearings en banc are generally rare and not favored by the 
courts; as such, they require a majority of the circuit judges who are in 
regular active service to order the rehearing by the full court.56 A 
rehearing en banc will typically only be ordered when consideration 
by the full court is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of its 
decisions, or when the proceeding involves a question of exceptional 
                                                 
50 See generally Hosty I, 325 F.3d 945. 
51 Id. at 949 (general view is to favor “broad First Amendment rights for 
students at the university level”). 
52 Id. at 947. 
53 Id. at 948. 
54 See generally id. 
55 Petition of Defendant-Appellant Patricia Carter for Rehearing with 
Suggestions for Rehearing en banc, 325 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2003) (No. 01-4155).  
56See FED. R. APP. P. 35(a). 
10
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importance.57 In support of the Hosty rehearing en banc, Madigan 
argued that the three-judge panel overlooked previous decisions that 
demonstrate that the law governing free speech rights for college and 
university students is not clearly established.58  
On June 25, 2003, a majority of the active Seventh Circuit judges 
granted the petition for a rehearing en banc and vacated the unanimous 
judgment of the three-judge panel.59 Despite the arguments put forth 
by Madigan, the Seventh Circuit likely ordered the rehearing because 
the case involved a “question of exceptional importance”: notably, the 
extension of a Supreme Court standard applied to First Amendment 
censorship claims.60 On its face, the case appears to be merely a 
procedural posture— an appeal of a summary judgment decision 
denying Dean Carter qualified immunity.61 However, beneath the 
surface, the outcome of the case could possibly define and inhibit 
college student speech both within the Seventh Circuit, and through 
the rest of the country because of its interpretation and application of 
the Supreme Court’s Hazelwood decision.62  
This underlying question of extending the Supreme Court’s high 
school-specific holding in Hazelwood, and applying it in the university 
context (as in Hosty), should— and likely will— come before the 
Supreme Court for clarification due to the lack of direction from the 
Court in Hazelwood (most specifically in footnote seven).63 Thus it is 
possible that the Seventh Circuit granted the rehearing en banc in 
order to set forth a more deliberate decision to submit to the Supreme 
Court so that the Court may fully elucidate its Hazelwood standard 
with respect to college student speech. Whereas the unanimous 
                                                 
57Id. 
58 Petition of Defendant-Appellant Patricia Carter for Rehearing with 
Suggestions for Rehearing en banc, 325 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2003) (No. 01-4155).  
59 See Hosty I, 325 F.3d at 945. 
60 See FED. R. APP. P. 35(a). 
61 Hosty I, 325 F.3d at 945. 
62 Id. 
63 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 n.7 (1988); but 
see Hosty v. Carter, 126 S.Ct. 1330 (Mem.) (Feb. 21, 2006) (denying certiorari on 
Hosty v. Carter (Hosty II), 412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005) en banc.). 
11
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decision of the three-judge panel was neither blatantly wrong, nor 
undermining of the uniformity of Seventh Circuit decisions, the three-
judge panel’s ruling was somewhat sparse, in that it did not explicitly 
address Hazelwood’s footnote seven and did not address any sort of 
forum analysis.64 For these reasons, the Seventh Circuit may have 
granted the rehearing en banc in order to better satisfy the Supreme 
Court by putting forth a more comprehensive analysis on this issue 
that will likely go before the high court at some point for much needed 
clarification.  
 
3. Editing the Story: Seventh Circuit’s Decision En Banc 
 
On January 8, 2004, an eleven-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit 
sat en banc to rehear oral arguments.65 The full panel handed down a 
decision, on June 25, 2005, supporting the university, and starkly 
opposing the previous decision of the original three-judge panel.66 In a 
seven-judge majority, the Seventh Circuit extended the Supreme 
Court’s Hazelwood decision to the collegiate level, yet declined to 
define the First Amendment rights of college journalists.67 With 
regards to the Hazelwood footnote in which the Supreme Court left 
open the issue of extending the “legitimate pedagogical concerns” test 
to the college and university setting, the Seventh Circuit majority 
contended that the “footnote does not even hint at the possibility of an 
on/off switch: high school papers reviewable, college papers not 
reviewable. It addresses degrees of deference.”68 The majority 
opinion, written by Judge Easterbrook, further asserted that 
Hazelwood’s framework depends in large part on the public-forum 
analysis, and (in contrast to the vacated decision of the unanimous 
three-judge panel) does not necessarily vary depending upon the 
                                                 
64 See Hosty I, 325 F.3d at 945. 
65 Hosty v. Carter Information Page, Student Law Press Center, 
http://www.splc.org/legalresearch.asp?id=49 (last visited April 14, 2006). 
66 Hosty II, 412 F.3d at 744. 
67 Id. at 735. 
68 Id. at 734. 
12
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speakers’ age/level of education, or upon the distinction between 
curricular and extracurricular activities.69 Judge Easterbrook cited the 
possibility that some “high school seniors are older than some college 
freshmen,” and also declared that many “junior colleges are similar to 
many high schools.”70  
The majority concluded that the Innovator did not participate in a 
traditional public forum because the newspaper received student 
funding, and because “[f]reedom of speech does not imply that 
someone else must pay.”71 Relying upon the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Rust v. Sullivan72 and National Endowment for the Arts v. 
Finley,73 the majority stated that Hazelwood’s framework for free 
speech analysis applies to subsidized student newspapers at 
elementary and secondary schools, as well as subsidized student 
newspapers at colleges and universities, like the Innovator at GSU.74 
Further, the majority suggested that even if GSU created a “designated 
public forum” or “limited-purpose public forum” for the Innovator, 
Dean Carter is still entitled to qualified immunity for damages because 
she could not have reasonably known that the limitations of the 
Hazelwood judgment and because she should not be held liable for 
“constitutional uncertainties.”75  
                                                 
69 Id. at 738. 
70 Id. at 734-35 (“The Supreme Court itself has established that age does not 
control the public-forum question. See generally Symposium: Do Children Have the 
Same First Amendment Rights as Adults?, 79 CHI.-KENT L.REV. 3 (2004) (including 
many articles collecting and discussing these decisions)”).  
71 Id. at 737. 
72 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (family planning restrictions did not 
violate free speech rights of Title X funding recipients by imposing conditions on 
government medical subsidies). 
73 Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998) (statute 
requiring National Endowment of the Arts to consider decency and respect when 
judging grant applications did not violate artists’ First Amendment rights because 
statute not directly aimed at regulating speech). 
74 Hosty II, 412 F.3d at 735. 
75 Id. at 737. However, the Innovator was published by the GSU Student 
Communications Media Board, which was made up of four students, two faculty 
members, and one civil service or support employee of the university. The Board 
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In contrast, the dissent of Judges Rovner, Williams, Wood, and 
Evans contended that the majority’s conclusion stemmed from the 
“incorrect premise - that there is no legal distinction between college 
and high school students.”76 Writing for the dissent, Judge Evans77 set 
forth two reasons why the law draws a distinction between high school 
and college level students: 1) high school students are less mature than 
their college counterparts, and 2) the missions of their respective 
institutions are different.78 The dissent concluded that “no pedagogical 
concerns can justify suppressing the student speech” in this case 
because the Supreme Court created Hazelwood for the “narrow 
circumstances of elementary and secondary education.”79 In addition, 
the dissenting opinion disagreed with the majority’s holding that Dean 
Carter is entitled to qualified immunity since decisions prior to 
Hazelwood consistently established that university officials cannot 
“require prior review of student media or otherwise censor student 
publications.”80 The dissent explained that neither Hazelwood, nor 
post-Hazelwood decisions, changed this well-established rule, and that 
Dean Carter “violated clearly established First Amendment law in 
censoring the student newspaper.”81  
 
4. Further Revisions Necessary 
 
                                                                                                                   
laid down the rules for publication and established that “each funded publication will 
determine content and format . . . without censorship or advance approval.” Id. 
76 Id. at 740 (Evans, J. dissenting). Judge Coffey, who ruled in favor of the 
student journalists at the first hearing, evidently changed his position and ruled in 
favor of the university at the rehearing en banc. 
77 Judge Evans also wrote the decision for the original three judge panel. See 
Hosty v. Carter (Hosty I), 325 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2003) reh’g en banc granted, 
opinion vacated, 
78 Hosty II, 412 F.3d at 740 (Evans, J. dissenting). 
79 Id. at 739, 744 (Evans, J. dissenting). 
80 Id. at 742 (Evans, J. dissenting). 
81 Id. at 743-44 (Evans, J. dissenting). 
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On September 16, 2005, the student journalists filed a petition for 
writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court.82 The Illinois Attorney 
General’s office declined to respond to the students’ petition, which 
prompted the Supreme Court to specifically request that the office file 
a response.83 Some legal commentators have viewed this as favorable 
for the student journalists because the Supreme Court typically only 
asks for a response if the Court believes that the petition likely has 
merit.84 Thus, this request demonstrated the high court’s interest in the 
case, and arguably illustrates that the Hosty decision en banc is worthy 
of review.85  
 
5. BREAKING NEWS: Petition for Writ of Certiorari Denied 
 
On February 21, 2006, the Supreme Court denied the student 
journalists’ petition for writ of certiorari.86 However, this denial does 
not establish that Seventh Circuit correctly extended the Hazelwood 
analysis and that the decision en banc is not worthy of skepticism by 
the legal community. If anything, it may suggest that the Supreme 
Court wishes to wait and see how more circuit courts will interpret the 
Hazelwood standard in future cases.  
Inevitably, the Supreme Court will have to accept a petition for 
writ of certiorari on this issue of whether the Supreme Court’s 
Hazelwood standard for addressing censorship claims relating to high 
school speech can be extended to censorship in higher education. This 
is a critical First Amendment controversy, stemming from the Supreme 
                                                 
82 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 126 S.Ct. 1330 (2006) (No. 05-377). 
83 Supreme Court requests response in Hosty case, Student Press Law Center 
(2005), http://www.splc.org/newsflash.asp?id=1115 (last visited April 14, 2006). 
(“‘Although your office has waived the right to file a response to the petition for a 
writ of certiorari . . . The Court nevertheless has directed this office to request that a 
response be filed,’ stated a letter from the Supreme Court clerk to the Illinois 
Attorney General’s office dated Oct. 27, 2005.”) 
84 Id. (quoting excerpt from Supreme Court Practice faxed to Student Press 
Law Center by Supreme Court’s public information office). 
85 Id. 
86.Hosty v. Carter, 126 S.Ct. 1330 (Mem.) (Feb. 21, 2006). 
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Court’s own elaboration of a standard for addressing high school 
censorship claims, and further confused by the Court’s inclusion of 
footnote seven which leaves the door open with respect to a standard 
for evaluating college censorship claims.87 The lack of direction from 
the Supreme Court up to this point has greatly confused the circuit 
courts, as evidenced in the Hosty decisions, and has led to a circuit 
split.88 Thus, even though the Court has now declined to hear Hosty, 
First Amendment jurisprudence requires the high court to clarify the 
underlying issue of the case. For the reasons set forth in the remainder 
of this Comment, once the Supreme Court does accept a petition for 
writ of certiorari on the issue of applying the Court’s Hazelwood 
analysis in the university context, the Court should establish that 
Hazelwood does not apply in higher education, as the Court half-
heartedly tried to establish by dropping footnote seven in its 
Hazelwood decision. 
 
II. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT OVERLOOKS  
CURRICULAR/NON-CURRICULAR SPEECH DISTINCTION AND 
ERRONEOUSLY APPLIES FORUM ANALYSIS  
 
The Hosty decision en banc conflicts with the Hazelwood 
interpretations of several other circuit courts.89 Whereas circuit court 
decisions have reflected the growing confusion in extending the 
Hazelwood analysis to institutions of higher learning, no circuit has 
interpreted the Supreme Court decision to extend to such lengths as 
the Seventh Circuit’s decision en banc— notably non-curricular 
speech in an institution of higher education.90 Specifically, several 
                                                 
87 Cf. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 n.7 (1988). 
88 See Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004); Brown v. Li, 
308 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002); Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342 (6th Cir. 2001); 
Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991); Student Gov. Ass’n v. Bd. of 
Trs., 868 F.2d 473 (1st Cir. 1989). 
89 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 260; Kincaid, 236 F.3d at 342; Student Gov., 
868 F.2d at 473. 
90 See, e.g., Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1277; Brown, 308 F.3d at 939; Kincaid, 
236 F.3d at 342; Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1066; Student Gov., 868 F.2d at 473. 
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circuits have declined to extend Hazelwood’s high-school specific 
analysis to evaluate censorship of college student speech,91 and the 
circuits that have extended Hazelwood have limited their holdings to 
curricular speech in higher education.92  
In the nearly two decades since the Supreme Court set forth its 
“legitimate pedagogical concerns” test in Hazelwood, circuit courts 
have for the most part been reluctant to extend Hazelwood to the 
university realm.93 For instance, the First Circuit implicitly declined to 
extend Hazelwood in Student Government Association v. Board of 
Trustees, on the grounds that Hazelwood “is not applicable to college 
newspapers.”94 Likewise, the Sixth Circuit, in Kincaid v. Gibson, 
explicitly declined to extend Hazelwood into the university context, 
holding that university officials violated the First Amendment rights of 
two college yearbook editors by confiscating and refusing to distribute 
the student-published yearbook.95 The Second Circuit explained that 
Hazelwood has little application in Kincaid because forum analysis 
requires that the yearbook be analyzed as a limited (or designated) 
public forum rather than a nonpublic forum.96 Because the yearbook 
was a limited public forum, university officials did not impose 
reasonable time, place and manner restrictions by confiscating all 
copies of the yearbook on the grounds that the quality was lacking.97  
The few circuits that have applied Hazelwood to the college 
environment are factually distinguishable from Hosty because the 
speech at issue was exclusively free speech rights within the 
classroom, and thus would not be thought of as a public forum or 
                                                 
91 See Kincaid, 236 F.3d at 342; Student Gov., 868 F.2d at 473. 
92 See Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1277; Brown, 308 F.3d at 939; Bishop, 926 
F.2d at 1066. 
93 See, e.g., Kincaid, 236 F.3d at 342; Student Gov., 868 F.2d at 473. 
94 Student Gov., 868 F.2d at 480 n.6. 
95 Kincaid, 236 F.3d at 347. 
96 Id. at 346 n.5. 
97 Id. at 354-56. 
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limited public forum.98 For instance, the Eleventh Circuit suggested 
that Hazelwood has some relevance at the college level in such limited 
circumstances as religious speech in the classroom environment.99 The 
circuit court explained in Bishop v. Aronov that university classrooms 
do not operate as public fora during instructional periods because they 
are reserved for the limited purpose of teaching a particular university 
course for academic credit.100 Likewise, the Tenth Circuit, in Axson-
Flynn v. Johnson, chose to extend Hazelwood to address college 
speech at issue in the case because the speech occurred as part of a 
mandatory curricular assignment during class time and in the 
classroom.101 The Tenth Circuit explained that the classroom of the 
university’s actor training program constituted a nonpublic forum, 
where university officials could regulate speech in any reasonable 
manner; and that the classroom could not reasonably be considered a 
traditional public forum, or a designated public forum, absent more 
direction from the university authorities.102 Yet, the Tenth Circuit 
explicitly recognized “that some circuits have cast doubt on the 
application of Hazelwood in the context of university extracurricular 
activities,” and that their Axson-Flynn decision did not need to put 
forth analysis on this distinction because of the exclusively curricular 
speech at issue in the case.103 The Ninth Circuit is also cited, though 
less frequently, for extending the Hazelwood analysis to the university 
realm in Brown v. Li.104 However, the Ninth Circuit’s extension of 
                                                 
98 See Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004); Brown v. Li, 
308 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002); Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991). 
99 Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1071. Bishop held that a memo instructing a university 
professor to refrain from interjecting religious beliefs during instructional periods 
did not infringe professor’s free speech rights. Id. at 1078. 
100 Id. at 1071. 
101 Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1290. Axson-Flynn held that an acting student at 
the university could be required to say script lines that conflict with the student’s 
Mormon faith as part of the curriculum. Id. 
102 Id. at 1285. 
103 Id. at 1287 n.6. 
104 Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002). Brown held that a masters 
student did “not have a First Amendment right to have his nonconforming thesis 
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Hazelwood is extremely narrow— only one judge on the three-judge 
panel explicitly approved of the application of Hazelwood, while 
another judge explicitly disproved of the Hazelwood application.105 
Still, the one judge to rely on the Hazelwood ruling qualified his 
application by stating that “[we] do not know with certainty . . . that 
Hazelwood controls the inquiry into whether a university's 
requirements for and evaluation of a [graduate] student’s curricular 
speech infringe that student’s First Amendment rights.” 106 
In contrast to the facts of both Hazelwood and cases where circuit 
courts have applied the Hazelwood analysis, Hosty does not involve 
curricular speech.107 Rather, the GSU college student newspaper was 
an autonomous extracurricular activity and not part of the university’s 
curriculum.108 The Innovator was overseen by a Board made up of 
“four students, two faculty members, and one civil service or support 
employee of the university.”109 The Board set up rules for publication, 
and determined that the Innovator would establish “its content and 
format . . . without censorship or advance approval from the 
administration.”110 Furthermore, Dean Carter’s complaints were not 
pedagogical in nature111 (as to render the objections falling under 
Hazelwood’s “legitimate pedagogical concerns” test) and a university 
                                                                                                                   
approved, nor did he have a right to a formal hearing with respect to his committee's 
academic decision not to approve the thesis.” Id. at 955. 
105 Id. at 950 (one judge writing opinion, one judge concurring, and one judge 
partially concurring, partially dissenting).  
106 Id. at 951. 
107 Compare Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Axson-
Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004); Brown, 308 F.3d at 939; Bishop 
v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991) with Hosty v. Carter (Hosty I), 325 F.3d 
945, 946-47 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Lueth v. St. Clair, 732 F. Supp. 1410, 1412 
(E.D. Mich. 1990) (declining to apply Hazelwood because high school student 
newspaper was not part of curriculum and not under principal’s ultimate authority). 
108 See Hosty v. Carter (Hosty II), 412 F.3d 731, 737-38 (7th Cir. 2005) en 
banc. 
109 Id. at 737. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 733. GSU officials complained that articles in the Innovator were 
irresponsible and defamatory journalism. Id. 
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should not suppress student speech merely because it dislikes editorial 
comments.112 Thus, because several circuits have refused to extend 
Hazelwood to apply to college level speech, and because the Hosty 
decision en banc is factually distinguishable from the circuit courts 
that have applied Hazelwood to the university realm, the Seventh 
Circuit likely erred in extending the Supreme Court decision to assess 
the censorship claims involving non-curricular speech in higher 
education. 
Moreover, the Hosty decision en banc is grounded upon an 
“overly mechanistic application of public forum analysis,” 113 as 
opposed to the curricular/non-curricular distinction, discussed 
above.114 Rather than relying on the “longstanding presumption that 
student media is not merely a public forum but an independent forum,” 
the Seventh Circuit majority instead examined whether the GSU 
student newspaper was operating in a public forum, a non-public 
forum, or a closed-forum.115 Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit’s forum 
analysis is likely inappropriate with respect to the GSU students’ 
censorship claim which involved an extracurricular college student 
newspaper. To compare, in Hazelwood, there was an actual need to go 
through this forum analysis due to the question of whether or not the 
high school student newspaper was a public forum because it was also 
part of a class curriculum.116 Such was also the case in the Ninth, 
                                                 
112 See Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456, 460 (4th Cir. 1973) (holding that 
university's president violated First Amendment by irrevocably withdrawing 
financial support from official student newspaper that had segregationist editorial 
policy). 
113 Brief  for the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education and Support for 
Academic Freedom as Amicus Curia in Support of Petitioners, 126 S.Ct. 1330 
(2006) (No. 05-377). 
114 See, e.g., Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 346 n.5 (6th Cir. 2001); Student 
Gov. Ass’n v. Bd. of Trs., 868 F.2d 473, 480 n.6 (1st Cir. 1989); Axson-Flynn v. 
Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1287 n.6 (10th Cir. 2004). 
115 Brief for  the Foundation for Individual Rights in Educ., et. al, and Supp. 
for Academic Freedom in Supp. of Pet’rs, Hosty, 126 S.Ct. 1330 (05-377). 
116 Greg Lukianoff & Samantha Harris, FIRE Policy Statement on ‘Hosty v. 
Carter,’ Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, 
http://www.thefire.org/index.php/article/6269.html (last visited April 14, 2006). 
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Tenth, and Eleventh circuit court decisions, discussed above, that 
extended the Hazelwood standard to assess censorship claims relating 
to curricular speech in higher education.117 In addition, the Supreme 
Court found the forum analysis necessary in Hazelwood because there 
was concern that the two questionable student articles might be viewed 
as being endorsed by the high school.118 However, in Hosty, the 
Seventh Circuit was not pressed to go through a forum analysis— the 
court was presented with the classic college student newspaper 
operating as an extracurricular activity, and freedom of student presses 
is generally presumed without the need to elaborate upon a forum 
analysis.119 Thus, rather than engaging in the overly-complicated 
forum analysis, the Seventh Circuit should have first evaluated the 
student journalists’ censorship claim through a simple factual 
examination of whether the Innovator constituted a curricular or 
extracurricular publication. 
Yet, even if the forum analysis was necessary in deciding whether 
there was a First Amendment violation in Hosty, the decision en banc 
should have still found a violation on the GSU students’ First 
Amendment rights. After reviewing the record, it appears likely that 
the Innovator was operating in a public forum.120 The student 
newspaper was an extracurricular activity, governed by a Board who 
established its rules for publication and who explicitly determined that 
the Innovator would “determine its content and format without 
censorship or advance approval from the administration.”121 Hence, 
                                                 
117 See Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d at 939 (9th Cir. 2002); Bishop v. Aronov, 926 
F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991); Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1277. 
118 See Brief for Student Press Law Center, et. al. as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Petition of  Margaret L. Hosty, Jeni S. Porche, and Steven P. Barba for Writ of 
Certirari, 126 S.Ct. 1330 (No. 05-377). 
119 See Hosty v. Carter (Hosty I), 325 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2003); see also , e.g., 
Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456, 460 (4th Cir. 1973) (“if a college has a student 
newspaper, its publication cannot be suppressed because college officials dislike its 
editorial comment”); Kincaid, 236 F.3d at 342 (college student yearbook is a limited 
public forum). 
120 See Hosty v. Carter (Hosty II), 412 F.3d 731, 737-38 (7th Cir. 2005). 
121 Id. at 737. 
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this university policy explicitly created a public forum for 
indiscriminate use by the student newspaper organization.122 However, 
even if the Innovator operated in a limited (or designated) public 
forum, as discussed by the decision en banc, the Second Circuit’s 
Kincaid decision suggests that the Seventh Circuit should have still 
held that Hazelwood is inapplicable to assess the GSU students’ 
censorship claim.123 If the Innovator operated in a limited (or 
designated) public forum, like the yearbook in Kincaid, then the GSU 
student newspaper could only be permissibly limited by reasonable 
time, place and manner restrictions, and thus Dean Carter still would 
not have been permitted to abruptly halt the presses at whim.124 
Therefore, the forum analysis of the Seventh Circuit’s decision en 
banc remains questionable in light of the extracurricular college 
speech at issue in the case, and the GSU policy apparently opening the 
forum for indiscriminate use by Innovator’s staff.  
 
III. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT OVERLOOKS  
HIGH SCHOOL/COLLEGE DISTINCTION  
 
Although the majority in the Hosty decision en banc asserted that 
Hazelwood provided their “starting point,”125 the Seventh Circuit also 
improperly extended that Supreme Court’s decision by ignoring the 
fundamental distinctions between high school and college students, 
and the different missions of the respective institutions— both of 
which Judge Evans noted in the vacated decision of the three-judge 
panel and in his dissent to the decision en banc.126 Instead of engaging 
in a forum analysis like the majority in the decision en banc, the 
original panel and the dissent of the decision en banc found this 
                                                 
122 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988) (citing 
Perry Educ. Ass’n. v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n., 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983)). 
123 See Kincaid, 236 F.3d at 342. 
124 Id. 
125 Cf. Hosty II, 412 F.3d at 734. 
126 See id. at 743-44 (Evans, J. dissenting); Hosty v. Carter (Hosty I), 325 F.3d 
945 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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analysis to be inapplicable to deciding the facts presented before them, 
as they were charged with ruling upon the First Amendment rights of 
highly educated adults in a historically free and open educational 
institution.127 
 
A. The Hosty decision en banc ignores the relevant age and maturity 
distinctions between high school and college students. 
 
The majority in the Hosty decision en banc failed to regard the 
important dichotomy between high school student speech and college 
level speech.128 The courts have consistently looked to this distinction 
in determining constitutional freedoms, and this distinction 
underscores the fundamental inapplicability of extending Hazelwood 
into the university context.129 “[T]he status of minors under the law is 
unique in many respects,” and age (for which grade is a good 
indicator) has been a tool the courts have regularly used to define legal 
rights.130 
The Supreme Court has explained that the First Amendment rights 
of elementary and secondary students in the public schools “are not 
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings,” 
and thus must be applied in light of the special characteristics of the 
educational environment.131 In particular, in Hazelwood, the Supreme 
Court emphasized the emotional immaturity of high school-age 
                                                 
127 See Hosty II, 412 F.3d at 743-44 (Evans, J. dissenting); Hosty I, 325 F.3d at 
948. 
128 See Nicholson v. Bd. of Educ., 682 F.2d 858, 863 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(stating that “[d]ifferent considerations govern application of the First Amendment 
on the college campus and at lower level educational institutions [and that] activities 
of high school students” may be reviewed more stringently than those of college 
students because “the former are in a much more adolescent and immature stage of 
life and less able to screen fact from propaganda”). 
129 See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986). 
130 See Hosty II, 412 F.3d at 740 (Evans, J. dissenting); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 
U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (“during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, 
minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid 
choices that could be detrimental to them”). 
131 Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 682. 
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students, and specifically explained that “a school must be able to take 
into account the emotional maturity of the intended audience in 
determining whether to disseminate student speech on potentially 
sensitive topics.”132  
Though Hazelwood informs the courts that younger students in a 
high school setting must endure First Amendment restrictions, nothing 
in that case changes “the general view of favoring broad First 
Amendment rights for students at the university level.”133 College 
students are distinguishable from high school students because college 
students are more mature, rational and independent thinkers.134 
“According to the U.S. Census Bureau, only one percent of those 
enrolled in American colleges and universities in 2000 were under the 
age of 18,” and over half of those enrolled are over the age of 22.135 
University students are not children; they are young adults, and are 
less impressionable than elementary and secondary school students.136 
As the three-judge panel in the original Hosty decision explained, 
treating college and university students “like 15-year-old high school 
students and restricting their First Amendment rights by an unwise 
extension of Hazelwood [is] an extreme step for [the Seventh Circuit] 
to take absent more direction from the Supreme Court.”137 Thus, the 
Seventh Circuit’s Hazelwood application in the university setting 
undermines the distinction between high school and college students, 
and infantilizes some of the most mature students in our nation’s 
                                                 
132 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272-73 (1988) (citing 
potentially sensitive topics such as the existence of Santa Claus and discussions of 
teenage sexual activity). 
133 Hosty v. Carter (Hosty I), 325 F.3d 945, 949 (7th Cir. 2003); see also 
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272-73. 
134 See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686 (1971) (upholding federal law 
that provided funding to church-related colleges and universities for construction of 
facilities for secular educational purposes; noting that pre-college students may not 
have the maturity to make their own decisions on religion, and that college students 
are less impressionable). 
135 Hosty II, 412 F.3d at 740 n.1 (Evans, J. dissenting); see also Hosty I, 325 
F.3d at 948-49. 
136 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 n.14 (1981); Tilton, 403 U.S. at 686. 
137 Hosty I, 325 F.3d at 949. 
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educational system.  
 
B. The Hosty decision en banc ignores the distinct mission  
of higher education. 
 
The Seventh Circuit’s decision en banc additionally 
underestimates the special importance that the Supreme Court has 
placed on free and open exchange in higher education.138 The Supreme 
Court has long recognized that the college classroom with its 
surrounding environs is the paradigmatic “marketplace of ideas.”139 
Colleges and universities seek to expose adult students to a wide range 
of viewpoints and strive to facilitate vibrant debates of “philosophical, 
religious, scientific, social and political subjects in [both their 
classrooms and] their extracurricular campus life outside the lecture 
hall.”140 In contrast, primary and secondary schools have a custodial 
and tutelary responsibility for their young students.141 Elementary 
schools and high schools constitute a principal instrument in 
“awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later 
professional training, and in helping him to adjust more normally to 
his environment.”142 
The Seventh Circuit’s decision en banc ignores the long-
recognized and long-supported relationship between higher education 
                                                 
138 Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972); see also Keyishian v. Bd. of 
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). 
139 Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wisconsin v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 233 
(2000). 
140 Southworth, 529 U.S. at 231. “[Wisconsin] law defines the University's 
mission in broad terms: ‘to develop human resources, to discover and disseminate 
knowledge, to extend knowledge and its application beyond the boundaries of its 
campuses and to serve and stimulate society by developing in students heightened 
intellectual, cultural and humane sensitivities . . . and a sense of purpose.’” Id. at 
221. 
141 Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 823 (2002) (holding that Fourth 
Amendment rights are different in public schools than elsewhere). 
142 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988) (citing 
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)). 
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and free speech,143 and thus extending Hazelwood at the university 
level risks the suppression of ideas and creative inquiry that is so vital 
to the nation’s intellectual life.144 This decision could have a snowball 
effect or, yet worse, a “tsunami effect”— spawning censorship of any 
school-sponsored student activity, and requiring students to gain prior 
approval in the realm of student government, theater, speakers, films, 
and a host of other expressive activities that are traditionally weaved 
into university life.145 In addition, the disastrous consequences of 
applying Hazelwood to the university context could “extend outside 
the ivy-covered walls.”146 A Hazelwood regime at the college level 
could turn “college newspapers into the timid house organs that most 
high school newspaper have [now] become.”147 Post-Hazelwood 
studies evidence “that high school newspapers suffered a severe 
chilling effect” after the high court’s decision and that students 
avoided covering controversial issues.148 At the college level, this 
“chilling effect” could further hinder the flow of ideas to the off-
campus readership, and also “chill” students’ post-college/on-the-job 
                                                 
143 See Stanley v. Magrath, 719 F.2d 279, 282 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that a 
public university may not constitutionally take adverse action against a student 
newspaper such as withdrawing or reducing the paper’s funding because it 
disapproves of the content of the paper). 
144 Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 836 (1995) (decided eight years after 
Hazelwood and involving challenge to university’s refusal to sponsor a Christian 
student group with funds intended to support a broad range of extracurricular student 
activities that are related to educational purpose of institution). 
145 Brief for Student Press Law Center, et. al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petition of Margaret L. Hosty, Jeni S. Porche, and Steven P. Barba for Writ of Cert., 
126 S.Ct. 1330 (No. 05-377). 
146 Brief for the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass 
Commcation and the Association of Schools of Journalism and Mass Commcation as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 126 S.Ct. 1330 (2006) (No. 05-377). 
147 Id. 
148 Id. (citing Carol S. Lomicky, Analysis of High School Newspaper Editorials 
Before and After Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier: A Content Analysis Case 
Study, 29 J.L. & EDUC. 462 (2000)). 
26
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 11
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol1/iss1/11
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                    Volume 1, Issue 1                    Spring 2006 
208 
reporting by interfering with campus newspapers’ “recruitment and 
training of tomorrow’s professional journalists.”149  
Fortunately, college and university officials in the states 
composing the Seventh Circuit have not yet used the Hosty decision en 
banc as an absolute license to censor, and instead many universities 
have employed the Seventh Circuit’s ruling as a platform to advocate 
for the college free press.150 In particular, the administrators at four 
public colleges/universities151 in the three states composing the 
Seventh Circuit have formally designated their school’s student 
newspapers as public fora— explicitly enabling student editors to 
make all content decisions without the threat of censorship or 
necessity for prepublication approval from the universities.152 Most 
recently, administrators at Illinois Central College have shielded their 
students from the Hosty decision en banc by declaring that students 
                                                 
149 See Brief for the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass 
Commcation and the Association of Schools of Journalism and Mass Commcation as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 126 S.Ct. 1330 (2006) (No. 05-377). 
 
150 Amicus Curia briefs were filed by two dozen media organizations, First 
Amendment organizations, and journalism education organizations, including 
colleges and universities. See, e.g., Answer of Student Press Law Center and Amici 
Listed on Reverse Side as Amici Curiae in Response to Defendant-Appellant Patricia 
Carter’s Petition for Rehearing with Suggestions for Rehearing en banc, 325 F.3d 
945 (7th Cir. 2003) (No. 01-4155); Brief for the Foundation for Individual Rights in 
Education and Support for Academic Freedom et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners, 126 S.Ct. 1330 (No. 05-377). 
151 The Public Forum List, Student Press Law Center, 
http://www.splc.org/publicforumcolleges (last visited April 14, 2006). (Illinois State 
University, University of Southern Indiana, University of Wisconsin Platteville 
operate in public fora; University of Illinois’s daily student newspaper is fully 
independent of the school and a public forum statement is therefore unnecessary); 
Matthew Chayes, College paper’s editors given control over content, CHICAGO 
TRIBUNE, March 30, 2006 at p.4 (Students at Illinois Central College will have final 
say over what is published). 
152 University of Southern Indiana president signs public forum statement, 
Student Press Law Center, http://www.splc.org/newsflash.asp?id=1070 (last visited 
April 14, 2006); The Public Forum List, Student Press Law Center (2005), 
http://www.splc.org/publicforumcolleges (last visited April 14, 2006). 
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will have the final authority over the student newspaper decisions.153 
However, there remain over 80 public colleges and universities in this 
region, and countless private schools, that have yet to follow suit, and 
it is unfortunate that such lengths need to be taken by educational 
institutions that have historically operated as free and open fora that 
encourage and promote a diversity of viewpoints.154 But unless the 
administrations of all colleges and universities in the Seventh Circuit 
states follow this sort of example and explicitly declare that the 
publications are public fora,155 the suspect forum analysis of the Hosty 
decision en banc will still threaten the college free press and still 
undermine the fundamental mission of higher education.  
 
IV. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT FURTHER MISAPPLIES  
SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT 
 
Hazelwood is a factually-distinct standard that is problematic to 
apply outside the specific context in which it arose— that of 
curricular, high school speech.156 Hence, once the Seventh Circuit 
majority decided to extend Hazelwood to non-curricular speech in 
higher education, the court’s suspect decision-making did not stop 
there. Instead, the majority’s logic in the Hosty decision en banc 
continued to fly in the face of Supreme Court precedent, as the 
                                                 
153 Matthew Chayes, College paper’s editors given control over content, 
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, March 30, 2006, at p.4. A faculty adviser at Illinois Central 
College threatened to shut down the campus paper after the student editors resisted 
the advisor’s demands to control the content. Id. 
154 The Public Forum List, Student Press Law Center, 
http://www.splc.org/publicforumcolleges (last visited April 14, 2006). 
155 See id. (The Student Press Law Center is encouraging students in Illinois, 
Indiana and Wisconsin to call upon their schools to pledge their commitment to free 
speech by explicitly designating their student media as “public fora” where student 
editors have the right to make editorial decisions free from administrative 
interference).  
156 See Brief for Student Press Law Center, et. al. as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Petition of Margaret L. Hosty, Jeni S. Porche, and Steven P. Barba for Writ of 
Certiorari, 126 S.Ct. 1330 (No. 05-377). 
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Seventh Circuit misapplied the high court’s analysis regarding 
subsidized funding and prior restraints. 
 
A. The Hosty decision en banc confuses student fees and  
government subsidies. 
 
The Seventh Circuit appears to have also ignored the critical 
distinction between funding from mandatory student fees and 
government subsidies.157 The Hosty decision en banc transformed 
student money into government money— “forc[ing] students to pay 
into a student activities funds earmarked for a student-run newspaper 
only to have [the funds] used to finance an administrati[ve] 
mouthpiece.”158 Because the Innovator was an extracurricular activity 
supported by student activity fees,159 “[t]he Seventh Circuit directly 
contradicted Supreme Court precedent by applying doctrines relevant 
to institutionally ‘subsidized’ speech.”160  
In particular, the Seventh Circuit improperly treated the 
mandatory student activity fees as a conventional governmental 
subsidy, diametrically opposed to the Supreme Court’s recent 
decisions.161 Under the high court’s analyses in Board of Regents v. 
Southworth162 and Rosenberger v. Rector,163 student fees are 
                                                 
157 See Greg Lukianoff & Samantha Harris, FIRE Policy Statement on ‘Hosty 
v. Carter,’ Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, 
http://www.thefire.org/index.php/article/6269.html (last visited April 14, 2006). 
158 Brief for The Foundation for Individual Rights in Education and Supp. for 
Academic Freedom et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 126 S.Ct. 1330 
(No. 05-377). 
159 Hosty v. Carter (Hosty I), 325 F.3d 945, 946 (7th Cir. 2003). 
160 Brief for The Foundation for Individual Rights in Education and Supp. for 
Academic Freedom et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 126 S.Ct. 1330 
(No. 05-377) 
161 Id. 
162 Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wisconsin v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 233 
(2000) (group of students challenged use of mandatory student fees to fund speech 
with which they disagreed). 
163 Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (Christian student publication 
sought student fee funding). 
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considered to be part of a pool of student money to encourage a 
diversity of views from private speakers, and “are not considered part 
of a university’s discretionary funds.”164 The majority’s analysis in the 
Hosty decision en banc cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Rosenberger, for example, where the high court held that 
the First Amendment prohibits a public university from denying 
funding to a student publication because of its religious or political 
message.165 Under the majority’s analysis in Hosty, the university in 
Rosenberger could demand both the right to review the Christian 
student publication at issue and to censor its religious contents “once 
the publication accepted any funding.”166 However, this is not what the 
Supreme Court held in Rosenberger, and thus evinces how the Seventh 
Circuit misconstrued the high court’s precedent in the Hosty decision 
en banc. 
 
B. The Hosty decision en banc undermines “prior restraint” 
jurisprudence. 
 
In concluding that Dean Carter is entitled to qualified immunity 
for ordering the printer to stop publishing the Innovator, the Seventh 
Circuit has further undermined the long-standing, widely-accepted 
premise that prior restraints are repugnant to the basic values of our 
society.167 As the dissent of the decision en banc explained, the law 
prior to Hazelwood consistently established that university officials 
                                                 
164 Brief for The Foundation for Individual Rights in Education and Supp. for 
Academic Freedom et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 126 S.Ct. 1330 
(No. 05-377) (citing Southworth, 529 U.S. 217; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819). 
165 See generally Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819. 
166. Brief for Student Press Law Center, et. al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petition of Margaret L. Hosty, Jeni S. Porche, and Steven P. Barba for Writ of 
Certiorari, 126 S.Ct. 1330 (No. 05-377) 
167 See Answer of Student Press Law Center and Amici Listed on Reverse Side 
as Amici Curiae in Response to Defendant-Appellant Patricia Carter’s Petition for 
Rehearing with Suggestions for Rehearing en Banc, 325 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(No. 01-4155); Brief for the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education and 
Support for Academic Freedom et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 126 
S.Ct. 1330 (No. 05-377). 
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could not require prior review of student media; and the law after 
Hazelwood did not change this well-established rule.168 The U.S. 
Supreme Court has steadily held that prior restraints on expression are 
presumptively unconstitutional,169 and the courts have long equated 
and analyzed state-mandated prepublication reviews as prior 
restraints.170 The Supreme Court has moreover asserted that public 
officers, like the GSU administrators, “whose character and conduct 
remain open to debate and free discussion in the press, [must] find 
their remedies . . . under libel laws providing for redress and 
punishment, and not in proceedings to restrain publication.”171  
Contrary to the majority’s logic in the Hosty decision en banc, 
Hazelwood was not generally understood to grant officials the 
authority to regulate college student media, at the time when Dean 
Carter ordered the Innovator’s printer to stop the presses;172 and Dean 
Carter, or anyone in a similar position of authority, would have 
reasonably understood such an action to constitute an impermissible 
                                                 
168 Hosty v. Carter (Hosty II), 412 F.3d 731, 742-43 (7th Cir. 2005) en banc 
(Evans, J. dissenting). 
169 See Neb. Free Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (“prior 
restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and least tolerable 
infringement on First Amendment rights”); N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713, 
717 (1971) (“Both the history and language of the First Amendment support the 
view that the press must be left to publish the news . . . without censorship, 
injunction or prior restraints”); Near v. State of Minn., 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931) 
(“[I]t has been generally, if not universally, considered that it is the chief purpose of 
the [First Amendment’s] guaranty to prevent previous restraints upon publication”). 
170 See  Answer of Student Press Law Center and Amici Listed on Reverse 
Side as Amici Curiae in Response to Defendant-Appellant Patricia Carter’s Petition 
for Rehearing with Suggestions for Rehearing en Banc, 325 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(No. 01-4155) (citing Fujishima v. Bd. of Educ., 460 F. 2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972) (rule 
prohibiting students from distributing any publication on school grounds without 
prior approval of superintendent violated First Amendment)). 
171 Near v. State of Minn., 283 U.S. 697, 718-19 (1931).  
172 See Brief for the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education and Support 
for Academic Freedom et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 126 S.Ct. 
1330 (No. 05-377) (explaining that even the “most comprehensive text dealing with 
higher education law does not even mention Hazelwood as a case that is applicable” 
to college student media). 
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prior restraint. In addition, as the Dean of Student Affairs and 
Services, Carter would have been reasonably informed of the GSU 
policy “that each funded publication ‘will determine content and 
format . . . without censorship or advance approval.’”173 Yet, despite 
the rather obvious warnings that her actions were improper, the Hosty 
decision en banc granted qualified immunity to Dean Carter upon the 
arguably faulty premise that she could not have known that she was 
acting improperly in issuing her directive for mandatory 





The Seventh Circuit’s extension of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
Hazelwood decision was an extreme step for the court to take, absent 
more direction from the Supreme Court, and in light of contrary 
decisions from several circuit courts. Even though the Supreme Court 
has recently declined to review the Seventh Circuit’s decision en banc, 
Hosty v. Carter is still worthy of critical and cautious acceptance from 
the legal community. The decision en banc conflicts with the 
Hazelwood interpretations of several circuit courts, preemptively 
extends the Hazelwood holding to college student media, and runs 
contrary to the spirit of Supreme Court precedent.  
As a result of the Hosty litigation, the Innovator no longer 
publishes at Governor’s State University or in any other forum,175 and 
with the Seventh Circuit’s Hazelwood interpretation still intact, it will 
not be surprising if the presses of other collegiate newspapers are 
likewise forced to shut down. For now, the only choice that college 
student journalists have is to petition their administrations to explicitly 
declare that their student publications operate as fully public fora, so 
                                                 
173 Hosty II, 412 F.3d at 737 (Evans, J. dissenting) (quoting the 
Communications Media Board’s policy statement).  
174 Id. at 739. 
175 First Amendment Center, Full 7th Circuit upholds college against 
newspaper, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=15452 (last visited 
April 14, 2006). 
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as to protect themselves from Hosty’s questionable forum analysis and 
suspect extension of Hazelwood’s standard for evaluating censorship 
claims in the university context.  
As a consequence of the Hosty decision en banc, the law 
regarding the censorship of college student media remains unclear in 
the Seventh Circuit. Thus, without further direction from the Supreme 
Court, courts throughout the country will inevitably muddle the 
Hazelwood analysis in future applications and misapplications of this 
factually-distinct, high school-specific Supreme Court decision.  
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